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Abstract  
 
Estimating Unofficial Economy in DPRK  
;Hamkyong Province from 1996 to 2003 
 
by  
In sook LEE 
 
Around middle 1990’s, 40 year-old command economy of DPRK witnessed 
starvation of its people, and for survival attempts of North Korean economic activity 
out of central government control had to emerge. This paper is motivated by the query 
about that economic activity which is out of government detection in North Korea; 
how large it is and how does it change over time? As one and only available and 
reliable data source for now, DPRK refugees provide the data of economic activity 
when they were in North Korea. Through the survey to them, information of overall 
household income and that from shadow economy is gathered.  
Based on the components of income data from the survey, size of unofficial 
economy in Hamkyong province of North Korea was derived. Simple estimates from 
income data, share of unofficial economy in Hamkyong province is at least 54% and 
on average 60.5% during 1996 to 2003, which is higher than that of previous research. 
That is, in Hamkyong province over half of household income is not under the control 
of authorities. This is intriguing since at the scotoma of communist authority, the 
growth of market based transaction in the shadow economy can imply that economic 
control of command economy in DPRK is undermined from the bottom. On the other 
hand, about the dynamics of the portion of unofficial economy reveals another 
interesting or seemingly ironic aspect of unofficial economy in Hamkyong province 
of North Korean, since even with economic crisis of collapse of the ration system and 
great dearth of bare necessity the share of unofficial economy had remained around 
55%, while after government showed strong will to economic reform at 2001 the 
share of unofficial economy abruptly increased, and it gradually dwindled since then. 
This sequel trend indirectly indicates that even though economic control of central 
government is undermined, the political control over the people plays determinant 
role over the latitude of unofficial economic activity.  
 
Key words; North Korean economy, Unofficial economy, Second economy, Shadow 
economy,  
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Ⅰ 
1. Introduction 
 
Like a huge black box, North Korea has kept her activity under the hermetic seal 
while her behavior exerts troubling influence on the international and intra-national 
arena. Nevertheless, it is known that around mid 1990’s, 40-year-old command 
economy of North Korea witnessed mass starvation of her people in dire state, 
although the exact magnitude of plight is still unknown. 
Statement of North Korean refugees, however, discloses that a bunch of North 
Koreans sought a way of making a living with the businesses prohibited by the 
communist principle in order to stave themselves off the starvation. Facing 
unprecedentedly severe shortage as to endanger their subsistence itself, many took 
part in private production and smuggle and the like which are out of detection of 
central government of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK), or 
North Korea. This is intriguing enough since at the scotoma of communist authority, 
the growth of market-based transaction of the shadow economy, or unofficial 
economy, implies that economic control of DPRK is undermined, or that transition 
toward market economy from a classic Soviet-type economy is virtually going on in 
North Korea from the bottom. At the same time, inclusion of this part of economy can 
indicate that the whole production of North Korean economy is actually higher than 
officially estimated.    
Therefore, pressing question is about the unofficial economic activity that is out of 
government detection in North Korea; how large the economy beyond control of 
authority is and how does it change over time? What are the implications for the 
future of North Korea economy? A few of considerations eventually come to terms 
with the fact that there is no credible and available official data of North Korea 
economy one can utilize for the unofficial part, so this paper is to be fact finding 
rather than empirical, which has its own right.  
As one and only reliable data source under this realistic constraint, North Korean 
refugees provide the data that account for the economic activities when they were in 
North Korea. Through the survey to them, the information of overall household 
income and expenditure is amassed and classified, from which income from unofficial 
economy is drawn out. In this paper, making simple computation with them, the 
estimates on the portion and size of shadow economy as well as its implications are 
derived for the period from 1996 to 2003.  
This paper unfolds like following; in chapter 2, at first, meaning of the unofficial 
economy in this paper is speculated on, and traditional methodologies to usually 
measure it will be introduced among which the most feasible one for North Korean 
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economy at the moment will be selected. And after reflecting on previous researches, 
the features of the data set used in this paper are to be explained. In chapter 3, rough 
qualitative description of unofficial economy will pave the way of understanding the 
object, or estimate result of relative and absolute size of unofficial economy over time 
and its implications in the next section. Finally, in concluding chapter, this paper wrap 
itself up with confession of limitations of this research and suggestions for further 
study   
 
Ⅱ 
 
2-1. Definition of the Term ‘Unofficial Economy’  
In whatever system of economy, a realm out of government detection, which is 
dropped out of macroeconomic figure accounting, always has long existed all over the 
world. Despite of its omnipresence, full agreement on neither the definition nor the 
term itself1 has not been achieved. Presumably, the reason why this is so is that the 
economic structure, from which it emerges and develops, differs case by case, so the 
germane scope of the definition should change.  
                                            
1 Due to the lack of consensus, in the literatures, even for the same phenomenon we find 
various terms such as “shadow economy”, “underground economy”, “second economy”, 
“cash economy” “parallel economy” “unobserved economy” “black market economy” and the 
like, which convey different nuance in each context.  
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Nevertheless, evasion from official calculation of registered activity is main criteria 
of defining unofficial economy (Tanzi and Macafee(1980), Daniel Kaufmann and 
Aleksander Kaliberda(1996), Feige(1989,1994), Schneider(2003,2005), Frey and 
Pommerehne(1984), Smith(1994) etc) 2On the one hand, circumvention of tax and 
legal burden is conceived as a main cause of shadow economy. (Simon Johnson et al, 
1998) On the other hand, however, to the communist country where all of economy is 
planned and supervised by political center, compliance with law, and dominant 
ideology matters (Grossman (1977), Los (1990))3. Especially for the latter, it was 
commonly accepted that chronic deficiency problem of the society was buffered by 
                                            
2 Tanzi and Macafee(1980) defines that the hidden economy is an economy that generates 
revenues that the official statistics do not register although they should. And all currently 
unregistered economic activities that contributes to the officially calculated( or observed) 
Gross National Product- used by Feige(1989,1994) Schneider(2003,2005) and Frey and 
Pommerehne(1984). For Daniel Kaufmann and Aleksander Kaliberda, it is unofficial activity 
as the unrecorded value added by any deliberate misreporting or evasion by a firm or 
individual. As such, it correlates with untaxed incomes and unrecorded capital flight. For 
Smith(1994 p18) it is market based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal 
that escapes detection in the official estimates GDP. 
3. The second economy or parallel economy is usually employed for the socialist country case 
and for Grossman (1977)“the second economy comprises all production and exchange 
activity at least one of the following test; (a)being directly for private gain, (b) being in some 
significant respect in knowing contravention of existing law.” And for Los(1990), the 
definition of second economy is “all areas of economic activity which are officially viewed as 
being inconsistent with the ideologically sanctioned dominant made of economic organization. 
In addition to illegal economic activities, the second economy also includes those types of 
activity that are formally legal but ideologically suspicious and therefore officially 
discriminated against and assigned a clearly inferior status” 
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the relatively efficient production of unofficial economy, or second economy. In other 
words, unlike non-communist society taxing4 is not the culprit, though it is obvious 
that the activity is also beyond official detection as in other cases.  
In line with this, the definition of Grossman or Los seems appealing for DPRK 
situation, at a first glance, but it turned out not to be applicable for the measurement 
of unofficial economy. First of all, in North Korea since early 1990’s, the law on the 
economic activities, which works main criteria of determining second economy 
according to Grossman’s test, has revised quite often, and it follows that legality is not 
able to robustly work for capturing the activity of the second economy with 
consistency over time. Take an example, among the stuffs that are allowed to be 
transacted in the farmer’s market5, rice was banned one time and permitted the other; 
essentially same activity switches its classification in terms of law, by which secularly 
consistent measuring fails. On the other hand, for the ideology criteria, it is obvious 
that the feature of its implicitness deters practical usage in estimation. Abstract words 
of idea of communism can be diversely interpreted, and in fact manifested ideology 
by leadership of North Korea has changed over time. Thus, despite of its importance 
                                            
4 In fact, in communist economy where the private ownership of (mean of production) is 
banned and collective production is of normal form, taxation cannot explicitly affect the 
incentive of individual.   
5 The farmer’s market is the place where the paltry amount of product cultivated in the yard 
of individual house is freely transacted. Although it has long been existed, it was regarded as 
‘doomed to disappear’ as society develops. As shown later, it is the farmer’s market that the 
unofficial economy started to bloom.  
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in North Korea, ideology cannot concretely tell us which is unofficial economy.   
Rather, for estimation of North Korean unofficial economy, more appropriate 
definition is the economic activity out of official’s account, regardless of legality, as 
Smith’s definition. It is because whether production and transaction are registered by 
central government or not is explicit and does not flippantly change over time. On the 
top of that, in the communist economy where central authority regulates all the 
economy from the price to the quantity of production, the economic activity out of 
detection is usually against the ideology and is sometimes against law. Thus, for 
DPRK’s case this definition serves more than that of Grossman or Los, unlike some 
previous researches on the second economy in USSR or in the former communist 
countries in East Europe. With this working definition, agricultural product from the 
private plot ‘toigi bat’or daily product from the private livestock that are transacted in 
the free market, whose price and transaction is not supervised by the central 
government, are representative examples of unofficial economy activity in North 
Korea. Though they were sometimes suppressed as against law and sometimes not, it 
has definitely been out of statistics of economic official of DPRK.    
 
2-2. Methodologies for Estimation of Unofficial Economy 
 
 6
By definition, just as we try to see the unseen, the measurement of unofficial 
economy is difficult, since it escapes inspection of government statistics by all means 
for several motives such as tax burden or legal punishment. It is natural that the agents 
of the unofficial economy are very reluctant to reveal their business. Thus, though 
methodologies6 of estimating unofficial economy were earnestly developed, none of 
competing methods is yet universally accepted or applicable. Thus, in order to find 
the most appropriate way to estimate unofficial economy in North Korea, it is worth 
to check methodologies that were usually applied.   
 
To begin with, for indirect approach, there are six methods;   
 
(1) discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics – the idea of 
this method goes that since income reporting tends to underscore the whole 
economic activity which includes unofficial part as well as official, subtracting 
national income from expenditure can capture the volume of unofficial economy. 
It usually holds for countries with a credible data for both sides, but it is not 
feasible as far as concerned with North Korea, because national income 
statistics of North Korea is still controversial and what is worse there is no way 
                                            
6 For more detail, please refer Bruno S. Frey; Hannelore Weck 1990 and Friedrich Schneider, 
Dominik H. Enste 2000 
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to get independent estimate of the expenditure statistics of overall economy.  
(2) discrepancy between official and actual labor force – Since the unofficial 
economy absorbs part of unemployment, the gap between both can capture the 
portion of it. Again, this approach is not the suitable to DPRK economy for 
now; even if North Korean authority provides official employment7 blowing up 
may contaminate the accuracy of data, since by law of DPRK all the 
economically active population should have a job, and the data of the ‘actual’ 
labor force is far from available.   
(3) transactions approach- this is based on the well known Fisherian quantity 
equation or MV=pT with assumption about the nominal GNP and V and pT. For 
application of this, price figures of the total volume of transaction should be 
available, but it is impossible to get for DPRK case at the moment. What is 
worse, in DPRK amongst unstable economic situation, the free market price is 
fluctuating even within a quarter and within a particular place.   
(4) currency demand approach; the key assumption of this method is that hidden 
                                            
7 For the first time North Korean authorities submitted economic data to UNDP to get the aid; 
among which the official employment at 1998 is included. And it reached as high as 98% 
employment rate. Source ; DPRK/UNDP. Thematic Round Table Meeting on Agricultural 
Recovery and Environmental Protection For the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), Annex A-R, Geneva, 28-29 May 1998  
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transactions of unofficial economy are undertaken only in the form of cash 
payments to avoid of tax burden. Therefore, trend of currency demand really 
reflects the overall economy of official and unofficial area. However, DPRK has 
neither explicit tax system nor announcement on the current and deposit 
accounts. More importantly, it turns out that not all the payment in unofficial 
economy in North Korea is settled with cash, rather cash crop like corn is 
frequently used or barter often occurs. 
(5) Physical input(electricity consumption) method8- this methods is widely used 
even for the communist unlike methods (1) and (2); it assumes that electricity 
consumption and GDP has moved in lockstep with elasticity close to one and 
therefore the electric power consumption is the single best indicator of  
overall( official + unofficial ) economy performance. Though it is preferred for 
transition economy, it is still not appropriate for North Korea. Above all, the 
precipitous decrease in energy supply from external shock9 around middle 
1990’s disables the key assumption of electricity and overall economic 
performance. In addition, it turns out that the activity of unofficial economy in 
North Korea does not mainly rely on the electricity power for economic 
                                            
8 This is also called Kaufmann-Kaliberda Method, since he artfully employed this method at 
his research at 1996.  
9 Previously the fuel was imported from USSR but as the collapse of it this support was 
ruined.  
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production. On the top of that, data on the quantity of electricity is again 
disagreed on between IEA and Korean Statistics department by large 
discrepancy.  
(6) model approach of DYMIMC( dynamic multiple-indicators multiple causes )- 
this implements a factor-analysis over time, the unknown coefficients for 
unobserved economy are estimated in a set of structural equations, but 
unfortunately it requires data on the several variables in the measurement model, 
and consequently, for now it is far from feasible for North Korea.   
 
None of candidates of indirect approach is not suitable method for now, then we 
cannot help turning to direct approach, which may free us from the need of reliable 
aggregate figures and enables us to reach the estimated portion of unofficial economy 
in DPRK even with some limitations. Direct approach is nothing but directly gather 
the data with survey on the economic activity in unofficial part as well as official one 
from voluntary respondents, and it relies on well-designed questionnaire that covers 
comprehensive information about economic activities. Considering all the constraints 
in the studies of North Korean economy, there is, in fact, no better option than data 
from direct survey at the moment. Just like the survey of the Berkeley –Duke research 
to the refugees from USSR, particularly designed interview is the second best. 
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Without any reliable official data of North Korean economy, refugee who has lead 
economic life in North Korea is one and only source of data on the unofficial 
economy in DPRK.  
This method has strong point that detailed information about the structure of the 
unofficial economy. At the same time, it is necessary to note that it has disadvantages 
too; it is unlikely to capture all the ‘shadow’ or ‘unofficial’ activities, so they can be 
seen as providing lower bound estimates. In addition, the result of direct approach 
estimate is very sensitive to the way of questionnaire is formulated. Although, 
abundant literature on education, culture, law, political system that give the holistic 
picture of North Korean situation were considered in the design of the questionnaire 
in this study and several corrections with pilot interviews were followed for the sake 
of comprehensive and unbiased survey, it still cannot completely crowd out another 
way of approach in the survey design and different result from it. Lastly, another weak 
point of direct approach is that respondent may be reluctant to cooperate, and hesitate 
to confess a fraudulent behavior in the unofficial economy. Fortunately, however, this 
problem can be minimized or eliminated in this study, since the interviewees were 
paid for the earnest answering and more fundamentally once after entering into South 
Korea, the interviewees of North Korean refugees feel free to say what they did for 
their living without concerning the punishment of communist authority. Putting in 
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another way, the interviewees already know that profit-seeking production needs not 
keep under the closet with fear any more, rather it can be welcomed once they are in 
capitalism society, South Korea.     
 
 2-3. Previous Researches on the Unofficial Economy in DPRK.  
 
Though handful, there has been a few researches on the estimation of unofficial 
economy or private economy10 in North Korea(Oh, 1996, Kim 1997, Dong 1997, 
Chun 1997, Nam & Moon 2000, Park 2002). None of them relies on the traditional 
indirect approach, while Kim and Park interviewed some refugees and others referred 
to the statement of refugees in the press or other documents. However, the estimations 
have limitations in providing persuasive and rigorous quantitative evidence to back up 
their arguments. Although it is a contribution that they introduced the previously 
unknown economic activity of North Korea, some of them11 fail to equip quantitative 
                                            
10 As mentioned above, the consensus on the term is not achieved even within Korean 
researchers. Some use second economy and others adapt private economy. In addition, the 
scope that researches used differs person to person, though all of them are beyond the 
authorities control. Roughly speaking, they can be classified to two, the first family is second 
economy or informal economy that Grossman coined; the other is private economy that the 
institution like World Bank or EBRD prefers. Therefore, further research implement, the 
discussion on the scope of concept should be preceded.   
11 Chun and Dong, for instance, conjectured the size of second economy based on the articles 
of newspapers. 
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approach and only refer anecdotal evidence whose credibility is sometimes still in 
doubt12, since they relied on the scrap of information from the public broadcasting or 
press on North Korea.  
Nevertheless, two papers among previous researches adapt quantitative 
computation to estimate the size of informal economy. At first, Nam and Moon 
extends the statements of refugees from other article on the unofficial economy to 
apply Leontief table to get the size of the unofficial economy, using national account 
system of Bank of Korea, and they argue 27.1% of GNI as an estimate of ‘informal 
economy’. However, they relied on several unrealistic or untenable assumptions13 for 
estimates by which undermined its logic. On the other hand, Kim roughly constructed 
his estimates of the second economy of overall North Korea, using only ten 
interviewee’s statement14. (Kim, 1997) Park (2002) relied on the information from the 
                                                                                                                             
 
12 For example, even when some DPRK refugee replies that roughly 40% of its economic 
activity is operated in the unofficial economy, it is not fully accurately driven, since unless it 
checked the income and expenditure flow that figure is just subjective finger counting which 
is not enough to argue that all of DPRK people has similar portion.  
13 For instance, when calculation the share of industry, they adapt that of South Korea, or they 
assumed that only 30% of private production is distributed in the market without any specific 
reason.  
14 That is, his study seems to rely on the answer for how large percentage of North Korea 
economy is second economy to the each individual, and unfortunately it is fully possible that 
a single individual if he or she did not work in bureaucracy of economy or statistics, cannot 
provide good estimate of the share of second economy and the estimate based on their 
statement could be misleading.  
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interviews with 98 North Korean refugees over seven years from various provinces, 
and he estimated that ‘private economy’ charges 3.6% of production in the whole North 
Korean economy based on the North Korean GNI constructed by Bank of Korea. This has 
weak point in that the number of samples for nationwide economic activity is as small as 14 
persons a year on average, not to mention that GNI as a denominator for the relative size of 
unofficial economy is controversial. Therefore, though there exists gap between both 
estimates of Park and Nam and Moon, none of them is much more persuasive. These 
limitations, however, are inevitable for any research mainly because of the dearth of 
credible data on the North Korean economy; even for the GDP figure there is still 
large discrepancy between estimates of various institutes.  
Thus, under the same constraint as previous research, this paper is different in that 
the regional coverage was narrowed down to Hamkyong Province, and in that the 
number of refugees is larger than ever before and the aggregate figure of DPRK 
economy such as GDP is not on the vital concern.   
 
2-4. Direct Survey to the North Korean Refugees 
 
As mentioned in 2-2, in this study survey of direct approach is implemented toward 
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North Korean refugees whose number skyrocketed from 200215 and its accumulated 
number outreached six thousand at 2004. After questionnaire was designed for several 
months in 2004 with pilot surveys, actual survey with the questionnaire was carried 
out at 2005. More than 730 respondents took part in, but sorting for the household 
head and earnest answering, the available data are 70316. On the top of this, the 
interviews for filling up the unanswered part in the questionnaire were entailed, and 
thanks to this painstaking process the detailed and qualitative information was added. 
Consisting of about 40 questions, the questionnaire covers the economic life after 
arriving South Koran and before leaving North Korea, and for the latter the income 
and expenditure in official and unofficial economic activity was asked, which will be 
utilized in this paper. And basis period of the economic activity at North Korea was 
adjusted to ‘last entire year’. For example, if an interviewee departed from North 
Korea on May 1997, his or her economic activity in the period from January to 
                                            
15 [Table 1; Trend of North Korean refugees in South Korea]  
Year 
Till 
’89 ’90 ’91 ’92 total’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ‘04.10
Number 
Of NK 
refugees 6,047607 9 9 8 8 52 41 56 86 71 148 312 583 1,139 1,281 1,637
Source. Ministry of Unification, Korea 
16 Some of respondents were redundant and other failed to fill in most of the answers. 
Because some are too young to do so, and other worked in military and therefore had no idea 
about the income and expenditure of household. And from time to time, they rejected to do so 
since reminding life in North Korea is heartrending for them.  
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December of 1996 was reported in the questionnaire. And it turned out that about 
75.6% of the all respondents replied that they participated in the unofficial economy 
at DPRK, though its activeness differs.    
Although the sample size is bigger than in any other researches, 700 household is 
still not enough, and furthermore this study is not free from the problem of deficiency 
in reliable economic figures on the North Korean economy, either. Coincidentally, 
however, about 81% of respondents were from Hamkyong Province17, which lies 
Northeast part of North Korea. Thus, for the sake of more rigorous estimate of 
unofficial economy, the scope of this research would better be narrowed down to 
Hamkyong Province at the cost of throwing out the information from about 140 
                                            
17 It is noticeable that even though Yang Gang Province and Ja Gang Province has bounder 
line of North Korea like Ham Kyong Province, the departure place is overwhelmingly 
centered on Ham Kyong. Now Ministry Unification of Korea does not provide the regional 
distribution of North Korean refugees home, if available, it would give another information 
on North Korea and the path of North Korean refugees toward South Korea.         
[Table 2 ;regional distribution of respondents] [ Table3: periodical distribution of Hamkyong 
people among respondents ] 
Respondents from Hamkyong 
Province Regional distribution frequency last normal year
 Ham Kyong Province 576 1996 93 
Pyong An Province 73 1997 159 
Hwang Hae Province 20 1998 60 
Yang Gang Province 15 1999 36 
Ja Gang Province 3 2000 48 
Gang Won Province 12 2001 50 
2002 53 Other 4 
( abroad or no response)  2003 61 
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households. Hopefully, the sample especially from around 1997, though not all the 
year, can work for more reliable estimate by providing data from 155 households. In 
consideration that the portion of population of Hamkyong province in North Korea is 
22.6%.18, we can hope that the estimation result from Hamkyong province could 
throw some insightful light on the economy of other areas in North Korea.  
 
Ⅲ 
3-1. The Qualitative Sketchy of Unofficial Economy Activity in DPRK  
 
Before going into the quantitative analysis of unofficial economy, accounts for it 
would help fathom the implications of the estimates. As mentioned before, unofficial 
economy is sensitive the context where it emerges and unfolds itself, so the reason 
why it emerges and how it develops has worthy of another research in its own right. 
Here, however, in this section, the brief description of unofficial economy activity is 
                                            
 [Table 4; Regional distribution of population in North Korea].  18
Region Distribution ratio (%) 
Ham Kyong Province  22.60 
Pyong An Province 43.20 
Hwang Hae Province 18.40 
Yang Gang Province 3.10 
Ja Gang Province 5.50 
Gang Won Province  7.10 
 Source: KDI 1996   
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replaced.   
 * The reason why North Koreans took part in the unofficial economy activity is 
largely from survival attempts, and to some extent it is helpful for the political 
leadership sustenance since it eases shortage crisis. .  
 To begin with, though it differs from place to place, around middle of 1990 the ration 
system of North Korea almost paralyzed and the salary also virtually stopped being 
paid. Hyper inflation in free market price from collapse of ration system made the 
salary obsolete, for one-month salary could cover only about 2 Kg of rice at free 
market. At first, they sold out the furniture or valuables to procure necessary things. 
Before long, people who had been accustomed to meet the bare necessity from 
rationing found out that they should take an action of self-help. The most common 
response of interviewees was that they were in so dire state, observing enormous 
neighbors, and even their beloved family to really starve to death in front of them 
everyday. Indeed, those who were bureaucrat were not in that much difficulty, but 
they are rare. Therefore, according to the statement of North Korean refugees, the 
obvious is that the participation in unofficial economy since mid 1990’s, despite of 
prohibition of government, originated from the sharp decrease of supply of food and 
items which people needed for survival.  
Other studies on the causes on the unofficial economy with microeconomic 
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approach adapts some model argues that tax system, wage rate is the culprit, relying 
on the neoclassical leisure-income model19. Though it is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the relationship between shrink of budget constraint under the subsistence level 
and choice of participation in unofficial economy with same model can back up the 
cause of unofficial economy. And for macroeconomic approach, again the tax burden, 
labor market restriction, the strength and efficiency of the institutions of government 
and the like are considered as main cause of unofficial economy, but it does not 
accurately hold for North Korean case. Rather, as you will see later in this paper, the 
conversion of government attitude affects the relative size of unofficial economy.  
 From the political leader’s point of view, to the some extent, the free market of 
unofficial economy is helpful in sustaining its power, since it cushions the economic 
crisis threatening to its existence. According to Frank20, such a ‘hybrid system’ is a 
rational solution for the dilemma; to increase production using free market without 
destabilizing political system. Parallel existence of state and free market, thus, is also 
somehow from survival attempts for leadership, too.  
 
* Items were varied, but were mainly food and apparel that were of large shortage, 
                                            
 Neck, Reinhard, Hofreither, Markus and Friedrich Schneider, 1989 19
20 For more detail about the political economy analysis, refer to, Economic Reforms in 
North Korea (1998-2004):Systemic Restrictions , Quantitative Analysis by Ruediger 
Frank. 
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and over time the items were diversified.  
The items agents in unofficial economy handle usually are foodstuff and apparel 
that are of deep dearth and universal need in DPRK. The forms of business are varied 
widely. First of all, those who have own plot harvested corn and sell it in the market 
after they consume it, which was not predominant form, but limited to land owner. On 
the other hand, there were persons who deliver seafood from coastal area to inland for 
sale. Above all, the most prevalent was the selling the cooked food such as noodle and 
bread in portable scale, and the most primitive form was just gathering herbs for 
living which was conducted by usually decrepit person or children. To my guess, the 
reason why great deficit goods, crop, is not prevalent business lies the fact that the 
crop is not easy to physically carry, so it is quite vulnerable to be the target of clamp 
down of bureaucrats, while the vendor of foodstuff is relatively easy to escape from 
detection. In addition, without private land and large capital, selling foodstuff is more 
feasible option to ordinary person; that is the entry bar is low, comparing to other 
types of business. And moonshine, by the same token, is not flourished much, 
according to the data from survey.  
Secondly, there was great paucity of shoes and clothes, and, what is worse, the 
quality of them was so low that the durability was quite short. For instance, the 
pyeonli hwa which is a sort of shoes that was home made and widely worn by North 
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Korean, can last no longer than one or two month on average. Therefore, they are 
popular items to consumers as well as the vendors in unofficial economy, and to meet 
the demand of them, shoes and used clothes were imported from China and transacted 
in the market with higher price.   
Indeed, in North Korea there also was seeker of shortage rent.21 For instance, 
electric appliance such as television sets, radio was also in the market, and the seller 
usually formally had or had had a related job such as repairman of TV factory, tapping 
the advantage of easier access to the goods. The metals and medicine whose dealing 
was strongly banned by law also were transacted in the realm of unofficial economy 
in the channel of workers who draws on their fortunate status. On the top of those, all 
of miscellaneous things were transacted by the vendors, they dealt with things 
everything within their reach, for making bread, according to the interviewee. Still, 
due to strict control of central government, firm level activity, like underground 
factory, did not emerge yet. 
 
* Speculation to exploit places was prevalent form, rather than producing items itself. 
In many cases, unofficial economy activity was related to the formal job.  
The most prevalent form of business in unofficial economy in DPRK would be 
                                            
21 rent, accruing to whoever is fortunate enough to buy the deficit goods at the low official 
price.  
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‘Duigeori Jang sa’ which means retailer or vendor. In North Korea, movement from 
one province to other is not easy, and it requires special permission of government, 
and even with the permission ticket it is not as fast as you think since the 
transportation is retarded. Therefore, to buy abundant or available things in one place 
and to sell it elsewhere lack with that item is so lucrative that many DPRK people 
were willing to walk several days in a low with risk of shackles in order to make a 
fortune. Putting in another way, they exploited the margins between different places. 
Thus, it is natural that most of housewives who could be free from job engagement 
mandate took active part in the unofficial economy, since they were not bounded to 
seat in the workplace unlike their husbands.   
Probably, on the other hand, the shortage of material input and fuel could deter the 
vender to set up manufacturing, thus a person whose workplace had access to 
materials took advantage of it, and purloined materials or products to utilize it. Thus, 
the more access by status of formal job a person had, the more profit he could 
generate in the informal economy. Along with this, if the formal job was related to 
specific skills, the worker utilized it to do a business outside workplace. Fitting 
examples would be doctor, hairdresser, and repairman etc.  
 
3-2. Estimation Strategy 
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 With data from direct approach to DPRK refugees, the way to get the estimates is 
not paved with complicated equations. Based on the information on the income from 
various sources, the income from unofficial economy can be extracted and it can lead 
estimates of ratio and size of unofficial economy. 
Overall income of households at last entire year22 are classified into three; the first 
one is formal income that includes salary of formal job, whether in cash or in kind, 
and pension, and the second one is from unofficial economy that includes market 
value23 of agricultural product and livestock product, net income of other informal job 
like vendor, smuggling, bootlegging etc, and the last one is the financial aid or loan.  
Method adapted to get estimates the relative and absolute size of unofficial 
economy in North Korea for each year is;  
Household income from unofficial economy= agricultural product(market value) + 
livestock product(market value)+ net income from other activity such as vendor, 
                                            
22Prototype of ‘last entire year’ is “last normal year” ; ‘Last normal year’ was designed to get 
distinct annual data and imported from the Berkely –Duke questionnaire. (1978) For example, 
if an interviewee departed from North Korea on May 1997, his or her activity in the period 
from January to December of 1996 was asked in the questionnaire. Consequently, last normal 
year was derived departure year from North Korea.   
23 In principle, the prices of all items are fixed by the central government, and the products 
from private plot or livestock were transacted not for the fixed price, but for market price. In 
addition, there are huge gap between them; the market price is even over ten times as much as 
the fixed price. And for essential necessity, like rice and corn is more than five hundred times.  
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smuggle and the like                                                  (1) 
Proportion of unofficial economy = Σ family income from unofficial economy    (2) 
Σ overall family income24
Size of unofficial economy in Hamkyong=the number of household×the rate of 
participation in unofficial economy(0.756 25 ) ×family income from unofficial 
economy per household.                                          (3) 
 
The number of the household of each year was derived like following;  
 
The number of household in Hamkyong =Total population ×the proportion of 
population in Hamkyong Province(0.226)÷the average number of family member per 
household(3.7)26                                                    (4) 
 
And for the currency unit, North Korean Won is used.  
 
3-3. Quantitative Analysis on the Estimates 
                                            
24 In the questionnaire, there are distinct question for overall household income, so it is 
directly employed.  
 This figure also was computed from the survey.  25
26 KDI provides the average number of family per household till 1987 and it is 4.8, while 
Park(2002) uses 4.3 for seven years span from 1995 to 2001 without revealing specific reason.   
3.7 of this study is the average from the number of family in the respondents.  
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 Implementing estimation strategy, with data from the survey to DPRK refugees, 
total family income per household, family income per household from unofficial 
sector and thereby portion of unofficial economy in Hamkyong Province was 
estimated as below.  
[ Table 5; estimates of portion of unofficial economy in Hamkyong province and other 
estimates] 
Last normal 
year 
Number of 
household3)
Total family income
(unit;Won)1)
Family income from unofficial 
economy  (unit;Won) 
Portion of 
unofficial economy
1996 93 59,800      33,900. 0.57 
1997 155 23,500      13,100. 0.56 
1998 58 43,500      23,700. 0.55 
1999 36 41,300      22,900.  0.55 
2000 46 41,600      25,600. 0.54 
2001 43 63,800      49,800.  0.78 
2002 50 247,600    168,300. 0.67 
2003 57 232,200    144,200. 0.62 
Note; 1)‘Won’ is North Korean domestic currency.  
     2) the figure of income is rounded off.  
     3) The number of respondents is less than that in Table 3, for some of them omitted the answer 
for total income of family or income from unofficial economy, which enables their data from 
utilizing in the analysis.   
 
In looking at the last column of the result table, it is clear that the portion of 
unofficial economy in Hamkyong province is at least over 54% and 60.5% on average 
over time. Putting another way, over the half of income is produced by the unofficial 
economic sector that is out of government’s supervising. Even though this study 
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covers only Hamkyong province, where one fifth of the whole population of North 
Korea resides, 54% is by far bigger than the estimates of Park or Nam and Moon for 
all over North Korea. In addition to this, considering the fact that the data of this 
paper only concerns household income, this could be larger. On the other hand, 
however, this overestimates itself in that bordering with China 27  and other 
idiosyncratic factors of Hamkyong province make unofficial economy there more 
proliferated than any other area in North Korea. Nevertheless since shortage problem 
is ubiquitous in North Korea and it promotes the activity of unofficial economy, this 
estimate may not be a far cry from the size of unofficial economy of overall North 
Korea. At least, we can argue that unofficial economic activity is not small as easily 
negligible.  
Consequently, the result can indicate that economic activity out of government 
recognition and control is more than half of the overall income of household in 
Hamkyong Province, and, one step further, it is obvious that the official command 
economy has been being undermined and market-based economy is germinating there. 
Then, how should we understand the magnitude of this figure? One may ask if over 
half of uncontrolled economic activity is panic or not. To give more sense on this 
figure, referring the estimate of relative size of unofficial economy in other transition 
                                            
27 Large part of goods are imported from China, so close neighboring is clear advantage for 
the people who imported and sell the goods in the unofficial economic part.  
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economies would help.  
[Table 6; The Portion of Unofficial Economy in Transition Economy of 25 East and 
Central European and Former Soviet Union Countries] 
Shadow Economy (in% off.GDP) using the DYMIMIC 
and Currency Demand Method  
country 1990/00 2001/02 2002/03 
Czech Rep. 19.1 19.6 20.1 
Slovak Rep. 18.9 19.3 20.2 
Hungary 25.1 25.7 26.2 
Poland 27.6 28.2 28.9 
Slovenia 27.1 28.3 29.4 
Lithuania 30.3 31.4 32.6 
Albania 33.4 34.6 35.3 
Croatia 33.4 34.2 35.4 
Macedonia, FYR 34.1 35.1 36.3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 34.1 35.4 36.7 
Uzbekistan 34.1 35.7 37.2 
Romania 34.4 36.1 37.4 
Bulgaria 36.9 37.1 38.3 
Seriba and Montenegro 36.4 37.3 39.1 
Estonia 38.4 39.2 40.1 
Kyrgyz Rep 39.8 40.3 41.2 
Latvia 39.9 40.7 41.3 
Kazakhstan 43.2 44.1 45.2 
Russian Federation 46.1 47.5 48.7 
Armania 46.3 47.8 49.1 
Moldova 45.1 47.3 49.4 
Belarus 48.1 49.3 50.4 
Ukraine 52.2 53.6 54.7 
Azerbaijan 60.6 61.1 61.3 
Georgia 67.3 67.6 68 
unweighted average 38.1 39.1 40.1 
Source; Fridrich Schneider, “The Size of the Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: 
First Results over the Period 1999 to 2003”, IZA Discussion Paper, N0.1431, 2004.  
Note; it is edited in increasing order of portion of unofficial eocnomy.  
The portion of unofficial economy in North Korea is slightly higher than Ukraine 
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before 2001, and after 2001 it is similar to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Although the 
share of unofficial economy is not an index of how a command economy transformed 
to market economy and the estimates from different method over national wide 
unofficial economy deters the carelessly direct comparison with the result of this 
paper, this table throws some light on the situation in North Korea economy on the 
international horizon.  
For the trend of unofficial economy over time, on the other hand, from 1996 to 
2000 it kept remaining around 55% despite of drastic economic fluctuation28 where 
average family income threateningly plummeted less than half( from 59800 won to 
23500 won). By contrast, it abruptly upsurged to 78% at 2001 when predicaments in 
the economy is rather alleviated, and it gradually decreased since then.  
What accounts for this specific pattern of change? Is this trend by income change? 
Correlation coefficient of overall income and portion of unofficial economy turned 
out to be as low as 0.42. Keeping in mind that main reason why unofficial economy 
grows in the communist country lies shortage problem, it is definitely noticeable that 
the sharp decrease in income around 1997, which can be interpreted as occurrence of 
                                            
 [Table 7; Trend of North Korea Economy]  28
'96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03  
Growth rate(%) -3.6 -6.3 -1.1 6.2 1.3 3.7 1.2 1.8 
Note; 1) ‘Won’ in this table is South Korean domestic currency that differs from North Korean Won.                  
Source: Bank Of Korea. 
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severe shortage, did not induce prompt increase in unofficial economic activity, while 
it skyrocketed when the income started to regain after the harsh period passed. Thus, 
it seems rather ironic, considering that the unofficial economic activity in North 
Korea is from survival attempts.  
One candidate of explanation29 would be the change in number of household who 
worked in unofficial sector. That is, the hypothesis is that participation rate in 
unofficial economy somehow sharply increased at 2001 and resulted in expansion of 
income from unofficial economy, while it had been unchanged before. However, 
participation rate of unofficial economy turns out not to be the culprit. See Figure 1 
where the rate of participation does not show significant co-movement with the trend 
of unofficial economy. Take an example, at 1998 when the estimated portion of 
unofficial economy is 55%, the participation rate (82%) is even higher than that of 
2001 (78%).  
                                            
29 Indeed, one desirable way is relying on the regression to reveal the reason behind the trend, 
but accurate data for variables to control out is not available, and for time series regression the 
number of data is not enough to derive some argument.  
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 [Figure1; trend of participation rate and portion of unofficial economy, 
respectively] 
 
Then, we can suspect external factor, political control, to affect the unofficial 
economy; as mentioned in the 2-1, the unofficial economy is against law or 
communist ideology. Even with internal push to increase in unofficial economy 
activity, external press can suppress its growth. Although shortage problem of people 
to be satisfied by unofficial economy needs expanding itself, political sanction may 
restrain it. In fact, the answers on the question about the dependency upon unofficial 
economy channel when North Korean was procuring food or other goods in the 
questionnaire of this study reveal that the need was steadily increased, regardless of 
sequel change of size of unofficial economy. See Figure 2.   
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[Figure 2 ; trend of dependency rate to unofficial economy and of portion of 
unofficial economy] 
With this viewpoint, the conversion of government attitude, or policy, can provide 
feasible reason. One explanation is that since confronting the deep and long 
slowdown to threat its political stability, North Korean government tried to 
rehabilitate its economy, and that leniency over unofficial economy would enhance 
unofficial economy to expand after it made up mind for market-oriented reform to 
regain its vitality of economy. That is, conversion of government strictness to improve 
efficiency could invite more freedom in the economy, and it resulted in the release of 
some suppresses on the unofficial economic activity and thereby enabled them to 
yield more profit, while returns from official economic sector did not change much. 
As a result, the income share from unofficial economy skyrocketed.  
Unfortunately, the data 30  on the leniency of suppression over the unofficial 
                                            
 Municipal ordinance may provide clue for this, but it is unavailable now.  30
 31
economic activity is not directly available, since it is not the thing that would be 
publicly announced and measured even in other countries. However, the change of 
government attitude on the economy problem was obvious. As well known, Kim 
Jong-il, the leader of North Korea made a visit to China on May 2000, and especially 
to Shanghai on January 2001 when he showed strong will for economic reform. And 
2001 New Year’s Editorial of the newspapers of the Worker’s Party, and the Youth 
League suggested ‘end to old method of economic policy’31, which can illuminate 
why the portion of unofficial economy sharply increased at 2001 in Hamkyong 
province. As a sequential move, as of 2002, ‘July first economic reform32’ was 
announced. This reform is regarded as the largest and deepest reform after socialist 
economy of North Korea was established and since Kim Jong-il took his power. And 
2001 would be the period of the test in which the government alleviates the curb on 
the control over unofficial economy activity, as litmus for the reform.  
About the decline of the unofficial economy after the July first economic reform 
2002, however, remains unexplained yet. One possibility is that the government might 
                                            
th “ The 2001 editorial characterizes the past, the 2031  century, as ‘a century of chollima’ 
specifically mentioning that this campaign started in the 1950’s.…. it could also mean that 
now is the time to bring an end to old methods of economic policy. At this point, it is worth 
remembering that publicizing a policy via the Rodong Sinmun is a move that usually comes at 
the very end of policy formulation process and marks the beginning of the implementation 
phase of the policy” p. 291. Frank, 2005.  
32 One of the features of this reform is huge price change; as an extreme example, the price of 
rice skyrocketed as much as 550 times. For more information about July first economic 
reform, refer to KINU, 2002 and Seo, 2002 
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mildly restore its strictness, though not much as before, but just up to promote North 
Korea economy without destabilizing political system. Or gradual decrease can also 
be interpreted that as more North Korean entered the business of unofficial economy, 
the marginal gain shrunk and there by the total returns decreased. Though, as you see 
just in the next, the latter seems more plausible, both are possible explanation waiting 
more data or evidence that will referee which one is true.    
The above explanation about the trend of unofficial economy implies that strict 
government control or regulation plays determinants over the immediate shortage 
problem for unofficial economic activity in Hamkyong province of DPRK. 
Unfortunately, direct evidence of repercussions of leniency of government or July first 
economic reform upon the unofficial economy sector is not available, but we can 
indirectly reason that less control of central government could make more room for 
unofficial economy to enhance its returns in the communist society and that it resulted 
in deteriorated income distribution. Though indirect and meager evidence, in Table 8 
Gini coefficient indicates worsen distribution after 2001 when the government 
heralded the strong will to economic reform, and when the portion of unofficial 
economy upsurged. Thus, though some conjecture is inserted to explain, we can 
carefully argue that the government curb on the unofficial economy is a bit more 
influential than exploding need of unofficial economy from the bottom, at least for the 
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case of Hamkyong province. In other words, although some part of command 
economy is undermined by the unofficial economy, the political control of 
government over it is still sternly binding. The unofficial economy of free market 
mechanism still remains ‘second’ economy although the first economy of command 
economy is virtually paralyzed.  
 
 [Table 8; change in income distribution in Hamkyong province]  
inequality measures of income 1996-2000 2001-2003 
relative mean deviation 0.56 0.65 
coefficient of variation 3.29 3.01 
standard deviation of logs 1.50 2.01 
Gini coefficient 0.73 0.81 
Mehran measure 0.85 0.92 
Piesch measure 0.67 0.76 
Kakwani measure 0.42 0.53 
Note; the income data used is from the survey to North Korean refugee in this study.  
One caveat should be added to the results in table 5; when on the first of July 
economic reform 2002 the realization of price and wage lead nominal increase of 
income. As an extreme example, the government price of rice jumped 550 times in 
this reform, while the wage increased about 18.8 times. Thus, the total family income 
and unofficial income, which sharply increased at 2001, does not directly indicate that 
the real income, or purchasing power enhanced.  
One more thing, one may ask how the prompt recovery around 1997 and 1998 was 
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possible. For this, referring the change in foreign aid to North Korean33 could help, 
since 1997 from the international institute and South Korean government, tremendous 
amount of support is injected. As large as 1.7% and 2.6% of total GDP for 1997 and 
1998 respectively34 are donated from outside of North Korea. The controversy on the 
effectiveness of distribution channel aside, assuming that the aid supported the 
plunging economy, the regained level of family income is not impossible.  
Secondly, estimates of volume of unofficial economy are listed in Table 10. Though 
since we already get the estimate of portion of unofficial economy, it would seem 
redundant to add estimated size of the unofficial economy, if we have GDP figure in 
hand. Nevertheless, under the situation where we have no single and reliable 
aggregate GDP( or GNI) of North Korea, it would be informative to grasp of North 
Korean economic situation, and by some multiplications with reciprocal of estimated 
portion of unofficial economy, participation rate and the like, it is possible to get the 
estimated GDP of Hamkyong province, though it does not include industrial 
production. From the survey data of this study, overall participation rate of unofficial 
                                            
 [Table 9 Foreign Aid to North Korea ( unit; thousand dollar)] 33
Year ’95.6 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 2000 2001 
Foreign aid 287900 102250 310730 333840 406760 295530 492640 
Source; Ministry of Unification.  
34 Here, total GDP(here GNI) used is the estimate of Bank of Korea, and they are `1770 
million dollar and 1260 million dollar for 1997 and 1998, respectively.  
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economy is 75.6% 35  which is lower than the result of Park; according to his 
interviewee, the participation rate is 87.7%. Assuming the 75.6% of all households in 
Hamkyong Province are involved in unofficial economic activity, overall sizes are 
estimated like below.  
 
 [Table 10, Size of unofficial economy in Hamkyong province]  
year 
Total household income from unofficial economy in 
Hamkyong (unit; North Korea million Won) 
1996 34,000 
1997 13,200 
1998 24,000 
1999 23,400 
2000 26,200 
2001 51,200 
2002 173,900 
2003 149,900 
Note; 1)‘Won’ is North Korean domestic currency.  
     2) the figure of income is rounded off.  
 
It is tempting to draw out the portion of unofficial economy of North Korea from 
above. Unfortunately, it is untenable not only because is the regional coverage 
disparate, but also because the GNI or GDP estimates of North Korea are different; 
the announcement of North Korean government, Bank Of Korea, UNESCAP, CIA etc. 
are different at each year, sometimes the gap is serious. For example, for 1996 the 
                                            
35 Though average participation rate of unofficial economy in Hamkyong province is 74.9%, 
here we adapt the participation rate from overall sample.    
 36
North Korean announcement of GDP is 10.3 trillion won, while the estimate GNI by 
Bank of Korea is 17.3 trillion won, and 22,764 million won is from the statistics of 
UN database. Furthermore, in dollar currency, base the exchange rate as well as 
GDP(or GNI) itself is different. Thus, direct application for the overall unofficial 
economy in North Korea is not telling for now, and persuasive comparison of size and 
portion of unofficial economy of Hamkyong province with those of North Korea 
should wait for macroeconomic data of overall North Korean economy that are more 
comprehensive and reliable. Here displays just the clue of how large unofficial 
economy of Hamkyong province is.  
 
Ⅳ 
4. Concluding Remarks   
 
Various methodologies were developed for estimating unregistered part of economy, 
but most of them were not feasible for North Korea for now. Direct approach with 
survey, available method at the moment, is opted under realistic constraint, and survey 
data of about 700 households of North Korean refugees are gathered. Though not 
large enough, this size of sample is larger than ever before. And among the 
respondents over 570 households departed from Hamkyong province, and based on 
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the components of income data, making simple and plain computation the proportion 
and size of unofficial economy in Hamkyong province was estimated.  
Estimates from income data, share of unofficial economy in Hamkyong province is 
at least 54% and on average 60.5% during 1996 to 2003, which is higher than 
expected from previous researches. If we assume that unofficial economy is most 
proliferated in Hamkyong province or that industrial sector is not related to unofficial 
economic activity at all, then this figure would be larger than the overall portion of 
unofficial economy in North Korea. Still, the estimates indicate that the command 
economy of North Korea is undermined from the bottom. And it is noteworthy that in 
Hamkyong province over the half of household income is not from the collective 
production under the control of government. At least, that the unofficial economy 
activity produces, on average, 60% by 75.6% of household earning implies weakened 
economic control of government in Hamkyong province or perhaps signs for 
transitioning toward market economy in North Korea. From viewpoint of the policy 
maker in South Korea, it has another implication that the virtual volume of North 
Korean economy than they estimates when accounting for reunification cost.  
And the trend of the portion of unofficial economy in Hamkyong province throws 
interesting issues over the dynamics of unofficial economy. Even with collapse of the 
ration system and great dearth of bare necessity, the share of unofficial economy 
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could not upsurge, while after government showed will to economic reform at 2001 
the share is abruptly increased then gradually decreased since then. Even though 
economic control of central government is undermined, the political control over the 
people plays determinant role over the latitude of unofficial economic activity. To bail 
oneself out from starvation, the participation in unofficial economy is inevitable to 
people in North Korea, but confronting the sanctions and punishments of communist 
party restricts the growth of unofficial economy.    
Limitation of this paper like most of previous research comes from the lack of 
credible and openly accessible data on North Korea economy, and even with excuse 
of realistic constraint, estimates from really small sample of North Korean refugee are 
not free from the critique of the credibility of the estimates over unofficial economy.  
In addition, the selection bias36 caused by the point that group of participants of 
unofficial economy overrepresents that in the population is also a defective of this 
paper. If more credible information is available some day, the estimates of this study 
would be rejected or accepted. I wish that the result of this paper is rebuked or 
debated with more affluent data in the foreseeable future. There remain enormous 
things to improve.   
  
                                            
36 As shown the regional distribution, the data in this paper have abnormally large number of 
people from Hamkyong, which may message another meaning of North Korean situation.   
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